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CASE COMMENTS
CHEEK V UNITED STATES: BELIEiFS THAT TAX CREDULITY STILL
GET TO THE JURY
JASON SOUGHT THE Golden Fleece, Lancelot sought the
Holy Grail, and John L. Cheek sought the magical formula that
would reduce his federal income tax debt to zero. His quest led
him to believe not only that his wages did not constitute income
and were therefore not taxable but also that the income tax itself
was unconstitutional.'
Mr. Cheek was convicted in federal district court of "three
counts of tax evasion, one count of false claims against the govern-
ment for income tax withheld, and six counts of willful failure to
file individual tax returns."2 These criminal convictions were
based on his failure to file federal income tax returns for the years
1980 through 1986,3 his listing of up to sixty withholding al-
lowances on his W-4 forms, and his "W-4 form [assertion] that he
was exempt completely from taxation."'4
The central issue at trial was whether Cheek had "willfully"
violated the tax law During the course of its deliberations, the
jury requested additional instructions from the judge on the legal
effect of a good faith misunderstanding of the law by Cheek. The
1311
I. Cheek v. United States, 11I S. Ct. 604, 607 (1991).
2. United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1989).
3. Cheek filed a "frivolous" return for 1982. Id. at 1265.
4. Id. at 1263.
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trial judge's instructions required that Cheek's violations be found
willful unless his incorrect beliefs about the tax laws were held in
good faith and those beliefs were "objectively reasonable." 5 Under
this standard, the jury found Cheek guilty on all counts.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Cheek's convictions.6 The Sev-
enth Circuit was the only circuit to require objective reasonable-
ness along with good faith misunderstanding in order to negate
the willfulness requirement. Because of this split in the circuits,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 7
A five Justice majority, in an opinion written by Justice
White, rejected the Seventh Circuit's reasonableness requirement
but distinguished between Cheek's misunderstanding of the tax
law and his belief that the law was unconstitutional." Justice
Scalia wrote a concurring opinion outlining his disagreement with
the majority's test for willfulness.9 Justice Blackmun wrote a dis-
senting opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, agreeing with the de-
cision of the Seventh Circuit."0
This comment argues that the Cheek Court correctly decided
the major point at issue, in rejecting "objective reasonableness" as
a prerequisite to finding a willful violation of the tax law Even
seemingly outrageous beliefs about tax law continue to be pro-
tected under the Cheek holding. Nevertheless, the majority opin-
ion incorrectly distinguishes good faith ignorance and misunder-
standings of the tax law from good faith belief in its
unconstitutionality; it held that beliefs of the latter kind do not
negate willfulness. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion correctly
identifies this inconsistency
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court and the "Willfulness" Requirement
First year criminal law students learn what every citizen al-
ready knows: ignorance (of the criminal law) is no excuse. In
more formal terms, the Court has long recognized the principle
5. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 608. Notes sent to the trial judge by some jurors at the time
the verdict was announced clearly indicate that Cheek had convinced those jurors that he
held these beliefs in good faith. Cheek, 882 F.2d at 1266-67.
6. Cheek, 882 F.2d at 1263.
7. Cheek v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1108 (1990).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 60-71.
9. Ill S. Ct. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. Ill S. Ct. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that "ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to
criminal prosecution.""1 The Supreme Court, however, has carved
out an exception to this principle in the area of federal tax law In
United States v Murdock, 2 the Court considered an indictment
for failure to supply information regarding deductions claimed on
federal income tax returns. The defendant had asserted that his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination justified his re-
fusal to provide testimony and information about the deductions.
The Court focused on the statutes'13 language, which required
conviction of a defendant who "willfully fails to supply such
information" 14 as is legally required.
In an often cited paragraph, the Court set out the meaning of
the requirement that an act be done willfully-
The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But
when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done
with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obsti-
nately, perversely. The word is also employed to characterize a
thing done without ground for believing it is lawful, or conduct
marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so
to act.' 5
The Court also indicated that the context within which the
word "willfully" appears may be useful in determining its mean-
ing."A In the Murdock context of federal criminal tax liability, the
Court stated:
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to
make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he main-
tained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure
up to the prescribed standard of conduct.17
Accordingly, the Court held that Murdock was entitled to a jury
instruction to the effect that his sincere and actual belief in a fifth
11. Cheek v. United States, Ill S. Ct. 604, 609 (1991).
12. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
13. Two statutes were at issue in Murdock, The Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §
1 14(a), 44 Stat. 9, 117 (current version at I.R.C. § 7203 (1988)) and the Revenue Act of
1928, ch. 852, § 146(a), 45 Stat. 791, 835 (current version at I.R.C. § 7203 (1988)).
14. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 392 (quoting the Revenue Act of 1926, chi. 27, § 1114(a),
44 Stat. at 116 (emphasis added)).
15. Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 395.
17. Id. at 396.
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amendment right might be considered by the jury in determining
whether his refusal had been willful.18 Only a willful violation
would be criminal. Ignorance of the tax law, or a genuine misun-
derstanding of it, would negate willfulness. Insofar as federal tax
law is concerned, ignorance is a defense.
The Court returned to a consideration of the tax law's will-
fulness requirement in United States v Bishop. 9 Bishop was ac-
cused under two sections of the tax law,20 both requiring a willful
act. Section 7207 defined the misdemeanor of "'willfully de-
liver[ing] or disclos[ing] to the Secretary any return
or other document, known by him to be fraudulent or to be
false as to any material matter.' "21 Section 7206(1) classified as a
felony "'[w]illfully mak[ing] and subscrib[ing] any return' under
penalties of perjury, 'which [the taxpayer] does not believe to be
true and correct as to every material matter.' "22 Bishop main-
tained that the word "willfully" indicated a lesser degree of scien-
ter in the misdemeanor statute than in the felony statute.23
The Court rejected Bishop's argument. In the course of doing
so, it further explained the meaning of the word willfully in the
tax law In tax statutes, "the word 'willfully' generally con-
notes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty It
[may be] 'bad faith or evil intent,' or 'evil motive and want of
justification in view of all the financial circumstances of the tax-
payer.' "24 In summary, the Court explained that it seeks an "ele-
ment of mens rea" where the tax law uses the word "willfully," in
order to "implement[] the pervasive intent of Congress to con-
struct penalties that separate the purposeful tax violator from the
well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of taxpayers. '"25
In United States v Pompono,28 the Court had occasion to
make an additional distinction concerning the meaning of "will-
fully" Pomponio was accused of "willfully filing false income tax
returns" 27 under the penalties of perjury, the same felony statute
18. Id.
19. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
20. I.R.C. §§ 7206(i), 7207 (1988).
21. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 348 (quoting I.R.C. § 7207).
22. Id. at 350 (quoting I.R.C. § 7206(1)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 361.
26. 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 10.
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at issue in Bishop.2 8 Along with the Bishop instruction that a
"willful act was one done 'voluntarily and intentionally,' 1929
the trial judge added that "'[g]ood motive alone is never a de-
fense where the act done or omitted is a crime,' and that conse-
quently motive was irrelevant except as it bore on intent."30 The
Supreme Court held that, in the tax law, "'evil motive'
[means no] more than the specific intent to violate the law ,,31 The
instruction was, therefore, found not to be given in error.
B. The Seventh Circuit and the Willfulness Requirement
Alone among the federal courts of appeals, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has held that a good faith error or ignorance of the federal
tax law defense also includes a "reasonableness" test.32 Seventh
Circuit judges betray an impatience with the "tired arguments"3' 3
of the tax protest movement,34 rejecting many of the tenets of the
movement out of hand.35 The policy underlying the rule is
obvious:
"[i]f the legal system accepts every mistake of law as a defense,
this leads people to be ignorant, to delude themselves, or to tell
tall tales to the jury. If the legal system either refuses to recog-
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. Pomponzo, 429 U.S. at 11.
30. Id.
31. Id. "Evil motive" was one of the descriptive explanations of the word "willful"
suggested by the Court in United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (quoting
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498 (1943)).
32. See Cheek, III S. Ct. at 608-09.
33. Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986).
34. "The term 'tax protester' apparently loosely refers to persons who the govern-
ment believes do not pay taxes for reasons of political protest." Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2,
Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991) (No. 89-658).
35. In United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, Cheek v.
United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), the Seventh Circuit held that the following beliefs
would never be considered "objectively reasonable" in the Seventh Circuit:
(1) the belief that the sixteenth amendment of the constitution was improperly
ratified and therefore never came into being;
(2) the belief that the sixteenth amendment is unconstitutional generally;
(3) the belief that the income tax violates the takings clause of the fifth
amendment;
(4) the belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional;
(5) the belief that wages are not income and therefore are not subject to federal
income tax laws;
(6) the belief that filing a tax return violates the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion; and
(7) the belief that Federal Reserve Notes do not constitute cash or income.
Id. at 1269.
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nize a mistake of law as a defense or accepts only a reason-
able mistake as a defense this leads people to learn and
comply with the law."'36
In the Seventh Circuit, "[b]elieving an incorrect proposition
of law is a 'reasonable' mistake only if there is a bona fide dispute
about it. Clinging to a proposition that has been unani-
mously rejected by numerous courts is not a 'reasonable' mis-
take."'37 Evidence concerning a defendant's good faith belief in
one of the "unreasonable beliefs"38 may be excluded from jury
consideration as irrelevant.
The Seventh Circuit is well aware, of course, of the Supreme
Court's Murdock rule and its subsequent interpretations of the
willfulness requirement. The Seventh Circuit view, however, is
that its reasonableness requirement is in harmony with Murdock.
"The reasonableness requirement is intended to give the jury a
method by which they can distinguish between a bona fide misun-
derstanding of the law and obdurate refusal to acknowledge (pre-
sent in so many tax protester cases) what the law indeed does re-
quire."39 As a matter of law in the Seventh Circuit, therefore,
certain "unreasonable beliefs" are found to be held only in bad
faith. This is the rule that was under consideration in the Cheek
case.
II. CHEEK V UNITED STATES 40
A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice White began by quoting the
language from the Internal Revenue Code sections that Cheek
was accused of violating. These were section 7201, which "pro-
vides that any person 'who willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment
thereof shall be guilty of a felony," 4' and section 7203, which
defines the misdemeanor of "willfully fail[ing] to make [a tax]
return" 42 when required to do so under the act.
Justice White summarized Cheek's efforts to pay no federal
36. United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987).
37. Id. at 104.
38. See supra note 35.
39. United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287, 291 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1990).
41. Id. at 606 (quoting I.R.C. § 7201).
42. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 7203).
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income tax. Although Cheek filed federal tax returns through
1979, he ceased doing so after that year.43 Beginning in an un-
specified year and culminating in mid-1980, he claimed an in-
creasing number of withholding allowances-reaching a peak of
sixty-on his W-4 forms. In 1983 he sought a complete refund of
all amounts withheld by his employer, American Airlines.44 As a
result, he was charged with repeated violations of sections 7203
and 7201 of the tax code.
During the years 1982-1986, Cheek was active as a civil
plaintiff, challenging the validity of the tax laws several times in
federal court. His claims were based on beliefs that are common
to the tax protest movement.45 Cheek was informed by the court
in those actions, however, that his beliefs "were frivolous or had
been repeatedly rejected by the courts. 46
Cheek's defense at his criminal trial was that he sincerely be-
lieved that the federal tax system was unconstitutional.47 This
sincerity, he argued, negated the willfulness required by the stat-
utes under which he was charged.
In keeping with prior decisions of the Seventh Circuit, 48 the
trial judge instructed the jury that "an objectively reasonable
good-faith misunderstanding of the law would negate willfulness
but mere disagreement with the law would not."' 49 The jury was
instructed that "if it found that Cheek 'honestly and reasonably
believed that he was not required to pay income taxes or to file tax
returns' ",50 he should be acquitted.
After deliberating for several hours, the jury sent a note ask-
ing for further instructions from the judge. They requested addi-
tional clarification on the matter of "'good faith misunderstand-
ing & disagreement.' """ A supplemental instruction was provided,
43. Id. The Court noted that Cheek filed a return in 1982 described, by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, as "frivolous." Id. at 606 n.i.
44. Cheek has worked as an American Airlines pilot since 1973. Id. at 606.
45. The Court mentioned Check's arguments that "wages are not income, that the
Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize the imposition of an income tax on individuals,
and that the Sixteenth Amendment is unenforceable." Id. at 607.
46. Id.
47. His belief was the result of his own study of the tax law and his attendance at
seminars given by a group which teaches that the federal tax system is unconstitutional.
Cheek also found an attorney who asserted that "the Sixteenth Amendment did not au-
thorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on gain or profit." Id.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
49. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 608.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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but at the end of the first day of deliberations the jury was still
unable to reach a verdict. It sent another note to the judge in-
forming him that they were "'divided on the issue as to if Mr.
Cheek honestly & reasonably believed that he was not required to
pay income tax.'"52
Later, the judge sent an additional instruction explaining,
among other things, that "'[a]n honest but unreasonable belief is
not a defense and does not negate willfulness.' ,,53 The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty two hours after receiving these instruc-
tions. Cheek appealed his convictions, but the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed, relying on its rule that only a reasonable mistake of law
negates a willful violation of the federal tax law 51
In the next section of his opinion, Justice White reviewed the
"general rule that ignorance of the law is no defense" 55 and
the exception that the Court has created in federal tax law
United States v Murdock, 6 United States v Bishop,57 and
United States v Pompon1o5 8 were cited. The Court concluded
that "[t]aken together, Bishop and Pomponto conclusively estab-
lish that the standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is
the 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty' ,59
Justice White then announced that the Court agreed with
Cheek's contention that the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in requiring that "a good-faith misunderstanding of the law
or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law" 0 must be
reasonable in order to negate willfulness. He next analyzed the
willfulness requirement. The Government must prove three ele-
ments to demonstrate a willful violation of the tax law- that "the
law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of
this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that
duty "' The knowledge prong is critical to a finding of willfulness.
When a defendant claims to have been ignorant of the existence
of a particular duty or to have misunderstood a duty, but does not
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
55. Cheek, 11I S. Ct. at 609.
56. 290 U.S. 389 (1933); see supra text accompanying notes 12-18.
57. 412 U.S. 346 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
58. 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (per curiam); see supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
59. Cheek, III S. Ct. at 610.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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claim that the duty imposed by the law is invalid, the govern-
ment's burden is simply to negate the defendant's claim of igno-
rance or the good-faith nature of the misunderstanding. The gov-
ernment will prevail in either case if it demonstrates actual
knowledge of the duty by the defendant. "This is so because one
cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty upon him and yet be
ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty
does not exist."6 2
Therefore, Cheek's claim of sincere belief "that the Internal
Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income" 63 would
prevail if the government could not prove Cheek's actual knowl-
edge of the duty to pay a tax on income. Any evidence demon-
strating Cheek's knowledge would be admissible, including "court
decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law,"6 4 instructions
from tax returns and IRS rulings. But the Supreme Court re-
jected the requirement that Cheek's claim be objectively
reasonable.6 5
The question of a defendant's belief, where that matter is at
issue, is a matter for the factfinder, here the jury By characteriz-
ing Cheek's beliefs as unreasonable, the Seventh Circuit trans-
formed the question of belief into an issue of law rather than fact.
A defendant's belief may be "irrational" 66 yet truly held. The
Seventh Circuit's rule forbidding jury consideration of evidence
that might be probative on the question of knowledge or belief
"would raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury
trial provision.167 It was therefore error to exclude from the jury
evidence concerning Cheek's beliefs regarding the taxability of
wages or his belief that he was not required to file a tax return.
The opinion then goes on to consider the trial court's exclu-
sion of evidence relating to Cheek's good faith belief that the fed-
eral tax laws are unconstitutional. The Court contrasts this type of
belief with good faith ignorance or mistake, which would negate a
willful violation of the tax law, as discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. Its conclusion is that such evidence may be excluded, "not
because [the] constitutional arguments are not objectively reason-
62. Id. at 611.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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able,""8 but because such beliefs demonstrate a different type of
knowledge. Beliefs regarding the unconstitutionality of tax law
sections "do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the com-
plexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full
knowledge of the provisions at issue."6 9 The taxpayer's very claim
of unconstitutionality, therefore, exhibits the knowledge that the
government must demonstrate to prove willfulness. Evidence con-
cerning a claim of unconstitutionality, therefore, may be excluded
as irrelevant.
Justice White provided two justifications for treating claims
of unconstitutionality differently than claims of ignorance or mis-
understanding. The first was that Congress could not have "con-
templated that a taxpayer could ignore the duties [he
was aware were] imposed upon him" 70 by the tax code. The sec-
ond is that procedures exist, other than continually refusing to pay
the tax, for testing a belief in the unconstitutionality of a tax stat-
ute. The taxpayer can pay the tax, request a refund, and protest
the denial to the courts. Alternatively, a taxpayer can refuse to
pay the tax and litigate the case in the tax courts when the tax is
pursued by the government.
The majority opinion concluded by setting out its holdings in
summary fashion:
[A] defendant's views about the validity of the tax statutes are
irrelevant to the issue of willfulness, need not be heard by the
jury, and if they are, an instruction to disregard them would be
proper. However, it was error for the court to instruct the
jury that [Cheek's] asserted beliefs that wages are not income
and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code should not be considered by the jury in deter-
mining whether Cheek had acted willfully 7'
B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority's judgment but
found fault with the major distinction drawn by the Court. He
found no "rational basis" for the majority's acceptance of Cheek's
good faith ignorance or mistake argument while rejecting his good
68. Id. at 612.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 613.
71. Id.
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faith constitutional argument. 2
Justice Scalia began with a brief review of the Murdock line
of cases,73 restating the Court's requirement that a "willful" tax
violation requires "'bad purpose,' or 'evil motive' of 'inten-
tional[ly] violat[ing] a known legal duty' -74 Under this standard,
"[i]t is quite impossible to say that a statute which one believes
unconstitutional represents a 'known legal duty' "75
A defendant's "erroneous reliance" on a tax statute or regu-
lation when ignoring a tax regulation or assessment, respectively,
also "meet[s] the [majority] opinion's crucial test of 'reveal[ing]
full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied conclusion,
however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and unenforce-
able.' "76 The majority's logic, Justice Scalia concluded, would re-
quire that such defendants be found guilty of criminal violations
along with those who base their reliance on the Constitution. Such
a conclusion "works a revolution in past practice." 77
Justice Scalia restated the majority holding in terms of a def-
inition of the willfulness requirement. His understanding is that
the opinion would find a willful violation of the tax law even
where a defendant was "conscious[] that some legal text exists,
[but was not] conscious[] that that legal text [was] binding. '78
This is not what the word "willful" has previously been held to
mean in the tax field, and Justice Scalia suggested that it is not
what a willful tax violation should be taken to be.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall joined, filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice Blackmun restated the Bishop-
Pomponio "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty"79 standard for willfulness. But he found it "incomprehensi-
72. Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 12-31.
74. Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Id. (Scalia, J., concumng) (quoting id. at 613 (majority opinion)).
77. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). On these facts, the majority held that Cheek could
be found to be aware of the tax law yet not conscious that it was binding (based on his
good faith understanding of the Constitution). Since the majority found Cheek to have
willfully violated the law on this basis, it can be said to have defined "willful" as rephrased
by Justice Scalia.
79. Id. at 614-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ble [that] any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as
his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that
the wage he receives is not income."
80
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun asserted that the "District
Court's instruction that an objectively reasonable and good faith
misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness" gives a defend-
ant more, not less, protection.81 The government must prove the
unreasonableness of the defendant's belief in order to make its
case. Without a reasonableness requirement, the government
would need only to show that the defendant did not hold the belief
in question in good faith.
Finally, Justice Blackmun claimed that the majority opinion's
standard would "encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of
the law in the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity "82 For
these reasons, he dissented from the majority's judgment.
III. ANALYSIS
Cheek v United States83 upholds the tax law's long-standing
exception to the rule that ignorance is no excuse. By doing so, the
majority opinion reaffirms a central principle of federal tax
law-that criminal liability for tax violations will not be found in
the absence of evil intent. This aspect of its holding is in keeping
with the Court's earlier tax jurisprudence. But Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion isolates an inconsistency in the majority hold-
ing, the distinction drawn between the culpability of one who acts
under a misunderstanding of the law and one who acts believing a
law is unconstitutional. Justice Scalia, however, misreads the ma-
jority's application of this distinction in his characterization of the
majority's definition of a willful violation. The dissenters demon-
strate an understandable impatience and skepticism regarding the
beliefs propounded by tax protesters like Cheek, but they offer no
precedential support for their position.
"Ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it."' 84 Holmes
explained this principle by reference not to the supposition that all
people know the law but that "to admit the excuse at all would be
to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to
80. Id. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
84. O.W HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 47 (1881), cited in Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 609.
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make men know and obey "85 The principle has been upheld by
the Court "whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated
and published regulation."8
But this principle has been modified in the area of the tax
law Where Congress requires that a violation be committed
knowingly or willfully, the actor must not only understand the na-
ture of the act being performed but know that it violates the re-
quirement to pay the tax. When a failure to pay a tax or file a
return is based on a genuine misunderstanding or difference of
opinion regarding the application of the law to one's individual
circumstances, the taxpayer does not know about the duty to pay
the tax. The taxpayer therefore cannot be violating a known legal
duty
The majority held, correctly, that the exception is justified in
such settings, because misunderstandings are inevitable in an area
as complex as federal income tax law An additional justification
for the exception is the compulsory nature of the tax. Regarding
voluntary involvement in a highly regulated area, the Court has
"presumed"' 7 that those involved are aware of regulations. That
presumption is not justified in the federal tax area.
The policy favoring the exception is less persuasive for those
areas or principles of tax law that are sufficiently clear. Wages,
after all, are taxable income.88 To a certain extent, then, the
claims made by the tax protester movement "amount to obdurate
refusal to acknowledge the law "89 Nonetheless, the majority held
that such a refusal may suffice to negate the willfulness require-
ment. They are correct in doing so, because an obdurate refusal
does not represent the level of culpability Congress required by
using the word "willfully" in the tax statutes. By requiring the
violation to be willful, Congress has made the mental state of the
taxpayer an issue. The simplest tax code section may be misunder-
stood even by a well-meaning taxpayer.90 Genuine errors or mis-
understandings as to whether a gift is income, whether wages are
85. Id. at 48.
86. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 561, 563
(1971).
87. Id. at 565.
88. See, e.g., Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing cases).
89. United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1987).
90. Even a well-meaning taxpayer may be expected to pay the lowest tax possible
consistent with the law. It is the intention to act consistently with the law that defines the
taxpayer as well-meaning.
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income, or "as to [one's] duty to make a return" 91 all seem
equally possible if not likely The Court's majority exercised admi-
rable restraint in not suggesting that all taxpayers who believe in
clearly erroneous interpretations of the tax law are either acting in
bad faith or are self-deluded.
While some taxpayers doubtless act with evil intent, determi-
nation of their intent must be left to the jury 92 "[T]he more un-
reasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more
likely [they] will [be] consider[ed] nothing more than simple
disagreement with known legal duties."93 Defendants shown to
have knowledge of the legal duty will be convicted.
The majority errs, however, in distinguishing a belief in the
unconstitutionality of any provision of the tax code from "a frank
difference of opinion or innocent error[]. ' '° The Court asserts that
such beliefs do not "arise from innocent mistakes caused by the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code."95 While it is true that
such a defendant may be mistaken about the Constitution and not
the tax code, that difference does not alter the Bishop definition of
willfulness: "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty "
Justice Scalia is correct in pointing out the inconsistency in
the majority's contention that a belief in the unconstitutionality of
a statute "'reveal[s] full knowledge of the provisions at issue' "
while an error regarding the meaning of a regulation or statute
does not reveal such knowledge. In either case, the belief may be
based on "a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provi-
sions are invalid and unenforceable."98 Without knowledge,
neither action reasonably can be found willful.
However, Justice Scalia seems to think that the majority held
that "a 'willful' violation is established by full knowledge of a
statutory requirement, but is not established by full knowledge of
91. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
92. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (where intent is an element of a
criminal violation, the state may not be relieved of its burden of proving that element
beyond a reasonable doubt).
93. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 611-12 (1991).
94. Id. at 612 (quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1973)).
95. Id.
96. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973).
97. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 614 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 612 (majority
opinion)).
98. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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a requirement explicitly imposed by regulation or order." 99 The
distinction is actually between the knowledge of a defendant
whose error, misunderstanding, or belief involves a tax statute,
regulation, or ruling and one whose error, misunderstanding, or
belief involves the Constitution. In the latter case, the majority
held that defendants who do not avail themselves of the appropri-
ate procedures for testing the constitutionality of the tax law can-
not be said to be acting in good faith. Justice Scalia's criticism of
the majority's departure from the analysis of a defendant's actual
knowledge is well-taken.
Justice Scalia also refuted the concerns that seem to motivate
the dissenters. They fear that the majority's holding will en-
courage taxpayers to cling to incorrect and definitively refuted
doctrines of law It will do nothing of the kind, in part because
"[t]he law already provides considerable incentive for taxpayers to
be careful in ignoring any official assertion of tax liability, since it
contains civil penalties that apply even in the event of a good-faith
mistake."' 00 Furthermore, it may be presumed that it is the rare
defendant who will be able to convince a jury, made up of persons
who pay taxes, that he or she has a good faith belief that wages
are not taxable.
The Cheek decision leaves in place a sensible exception to the
rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse. However, the opinion
narrows the exception when it shifts its concern from the mental
state of the defendant to the source of the law misunderstood. The
majority opinion exposes to criminal penalties sincere, although
misguided, taxpayers. The Cheek decision, therefore, is only a
partial vindication of the principle that criminal convictions for
tax law violations must be based on a finding of evil purpose.
DANIEL ANKER
99. Id. (Scalia, J., concumng).
100. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
13251991]

